

SECT. III. *Of the taste of beauty.* 45

disposed as to set off to advantage the separate brightness or beauty of each other.

THERE is perhaps no term used in a looser sense than beauty, which is applied to almost every thing that pleases us. Though this usage is doubtless too indefinite, we may, without a faulty deviation from precision, apply this epithet to every pleasure which is conveyed by the eye, and which has not got a proper and peculiar name; to the pleasure we receive, either when an object of sight suggests pleasant ideas of other senses; or when the ideas suggested are agreeable ones formed from the sensations of sight; or when both these circumstances concur. In all these cases, beauty is, at least in part, resolvable into association.

THE first method of effecting beauty, we have already seen exemplified in colours, which are themselves objects of sight introducing pleasant ideas not derived from sight. Thus also the structure of a human face often indicates good mental dispositions, which are not only themselves approved as virtuous, but by being so, diffuse a beauty over the countenance in which they are imprinted: but
bad

bad affections, expressed in the look, throw deformity upon the finest features.

In the second way is produced the only beauty of thought or sentiment, which comes properly under the present head; that beauty which arises, when the subject described is agreeable to sight, as light, flowers, fields, meadows, groves; or when it is illustrated by images from things that are so agreeable. This is one great part of the beauty of pastoral; and enters in some degree into every kind of poetry (c).

To the third cause, or the union of both the former, imitations of *beautiful* originals, by figure and colour, owe their beauty. It is observable that the arts which use these instruments have greater advantages for imitating beauty than sublimity. This they can represent, as we have seen, only by suggesting *ideas* of grand objects; but the copies would not, if considered as originals, be grand; since they are almost ever destitute of magnitude, its most essential requisite. But imita-

(c) The other qualities which render sentiments beautiful or agreeable, as metaphor, fable, antithesis, morality, elevation, &c. belong to other classes.

SECT. III. *Of the taste of beauty.* 47

tions of beautiful originals, independent of their resemblance to these, are beautiful; since they cannot otherways exhibit their beauties to the thought, than by themselves possessing them in some degree: and often they possess them as perfectly as their archetypes. A statue has the same regularity and proportion as its original. A painting may equal the object it represents, not only in symmetry and propriety, but in colour.

THE classes of beauty, which we have been explaining, are distinct in their principles, though by reason of the similitude of their feeling, they are reduced to the same genus. But they are often in things variously united, and by their union they render our satisfaction more intense. In a fine face all the principles of beauty are combined. To an exact symmetry and regular proportion of varied features, and parts nicely adapted to their several purposes, is superadded complexion, composed of white and red, colours beautiful in themselves rendered still more so by the artful manner in which they are disposed, and by their indicating health and freshness; and the grace of the whole is heightened by
a quick

a quick expressiveness of aspect, which forces us instantaneously to perceive acuteness, sagacity, sedateness, sweetness, or the like amiable qualities, in the mind which animates the elegant form ; while the approbation attending this perception is reflected back upon the face which gave occasion to it.

SECT.

S E C T. IV.

Of the sense or taste of imitation.

EXACTNESS and liveness of imitation supply us with another pleasure of taste, which, as it has no peculiar name, is commonly expressed by that of beauty; and is by some termed relative or secondary, to distinguish it from the kinds above explained, which are called absolute or primary (*d*). We have a natural sense, which is highly gratified by a designed resemblance, though there be nothing agreeable in the original. Similitude is a very powerful principle of association, which, by continually connecting the ideas in which it is found, and leading our thoughts from one of them to the other, produces in mankind a strong tendency to comparison. As comparison implies in the very act a gentle exertion of the mind, it is on that account agreeable. As a farther energy is requisite for discovering the original by the copy; and as this discovery produces a grateful consciousness of our own discern-

(*d*) See HUTCHESON'S Enquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue. Treat. I. Sect. iv.

ment and sagacity, and includes the pleasant feeling of success; the recognizing resemblance, in consequence of comparison, augments our pleasure (*e*). And when the imitation is intended, our admiration of the skill and ingenuity of the artist diffuses itself over the effect from which that skill is inferred, and compleats the delight which the work inspires.

HENCE the rapture with which a connoisseur beholds the capital performances of the eminent masters in painting or sculpture. Hence the main excellence of poetical or eloquent descriptions; the characteristical perfection of which arises from the author's judiciously selecting the most essential and striking qualities of his subject, and combining them into such a picture as quickly revives in the reader, and strongly impresses on his mind a lively idea of the original. The fundamental beauty of metaphor and allegory lies in their insinuating the analogies of things; that of similitude and comparison in their more explicitly proposing these analogies. By this they com-

(*e*) Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς ἑνότητας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει διανοήσας μάλιστα καὶ συνδυάζεσθαι, τί ἕκαστον. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤ. περὶ Ποιητικῆς, κεφ. δ.

Sect. IV. *Of the taste of imitation.* 51

municate fineness to a sentiment. Most of the figures and tropes of eloquence derive their grace from their being so employed, as to correspond with the natural expressions or objects of those passions and sentiments, which actuate the orator, or which he would inspire into his audience. Improbability, which is a want of resemblance to natural things, always renders a fable or story less entertaining; and if the improbability be very great, or extend to the material parts, it often makes it wholly nauseous.

WHEN excellent originals are imitated, the copies derive their charms, not merely from exactness of imitation, but also from the excellence which they represent; and the gratification which these copies afford may almost as properly be ascribed to beauty or sublimity as to imitation. As the beauty here is complicated in its principles, it will of consequence be also compounded in its effect, and will ravish the mind much more than either of its constituents alone. An *Hercules*, exhibiting proportion, strength, and fortitude in perfection, must be a finer statue than the exactest imitation of a *Thersites* or *Silenus*. The works of *Polygnotus*, which represented beautiful objects, were

doubtless more delightful than the pictures of *Dionysius* or *Pausan*, however skillfully they might represent ordinary or faulty objects (*f*). The ancient *Greek*, or the modern *Italian* painters will always be preferable to the *Flemish*, who, though they imitate well, do not make a judicious choice of such beauties of nature as deserve to be imitated (*g*). The *Margites* of *Homer* could not have given us so high entertainment as we receive from the *Iliad*. A comparison, however nicely suited to the subject, will please still more, if it is taken from what conveys no ideas, but such as are noble and agreeable: and indeed by suggesting such as are strongly the reverse, it will be suffi-

(*f*) Πολύγυτος μὲν κρείττους, Πάυσαν δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἰκαζει. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤ. περὶ ποιητ. καφ. β'.

(*g*) In this particular the ancient artists were so careful, that they were not content with imitating the most perfect individuals, they could meet with; but, collecting the perfections of many, they formed one general idea more complete, than could be drawn from any single real existence. "Ουτεὶ τρόποι καὶ τὰς τὰ ἀγάλματα τέτοις διαπλάττουσι, οἱ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν ἐκάστοις καλὸν συναγαγόντες, κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐκ διαφορῶν σωμάτων ἀθροίσαντες, ὥς μίμῃσιν μίαν, καὶ ἄλλος ἢ ὕμνος καὶ ἄρτιον καὶ ἡρμῶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἐξαιργάσαντο. καὶ ἐκ αὐτῆς ἰδέας σῶμα ἀκριβὲς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγάλματι ὅμοιον. ΜΑΞ. ΤΥΡ. λογ. ζ'. Καὶ μὲν πᾶσι γὰρ καλὰ εἶδη ἀφαιμιέντες, ἐπειδὴ ἑκάστος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιεχὼν ἀμειψόμενα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συναγόντες τὰ ἐξ ἐκάστου κάλλους, ὅπως ἴδωσι τὰ σώματα καλὰ πᾶσι φάινεσθαι. ΞΕΝΟΦ. Απομνημ. βιβ. 7.

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SECT. VI. *Of the taste of imitation.* 53

cient to turn the most magnificent subject into ridicule.

BUT still the force of imitation is most conspicuous, when no other principles concur to heighten its effect: for as it is then pure and unmixed, we cannot question, that the whole pleasure of the sentiment produced is owing to it alone. Its power is indeed so great, that it not only, without the assistance of other principles, produces a considerable degree of pleasure; but often recommends and gains the preference to imperfect or faulty originals; and makes things grateful when reflected by it, which would be very ungrateful, if viewed directly. The rudest rocks and mountains; the objects that in nature are most deformed; even disease and pain, acquire beauty when skillfully imitated in painting (*b*). It is chiefly by copying imperfections and absurdities that mimicry and humour please. A perfect imitation of characters morally evil, can make us dwell with pleasure on them, notwithstanding the uneasy sentiments of disapprobation

(*b*) "Α γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ἀειμῶν, τῶν τὰς οὐσίας τὰς μέγιστα
ἡμετέρας, χάριτον διωρῶντες: εἰς θνήσκοντες μεφῶς τῶν ἀγρίων
τάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. ΑΡΙΣΤ. περὶ ποιητ. καρ. β.

and abhorrence which they excite. The character of *Iago* is detestable, but we admire *Shakespear's* representation of it. Nay imperfect and mixt characters are, in all kinds of writing, preferred to faultless ones, as being juster copies of real nature. The pleasant sensation resulting from the imitation is so intense, that it overpowers and converts into delight even the *uneasy* impressions, which spring from the objects imitated. There can be no stronger proof of the force of imitation in conferring on its effects the power of pleasing, than its rendering those passions agreeable, when excited by it, which, when produced in the natural way, are pure and unmixt pain. Suspense, anxiety, terror, when produced in Tragedy, by imitation of their objects and causes, and infused by sympathy, afford not only a more serious, but a much intenser and nobler satisfaction, than all the laughter and joy, which farce or comedy can inspire. When thus secondarily produced, they agitate and employ the mind, and rouse and give scope to its greatest activity; while at the same time our implicit knowledge that the occasion is remote or fictitious, enables the pleasure of imitation to relieve

SECT. IV. *Of the taste of imitation.* 55

relieve the pure torment, which would attend their primary operation.

FROM what has been said, it is obvious that the pleasure of imitation arises from a combination of causes. Besides the act of comparison, which is the same in all instances, the exactness of the resemblance, our discovery of it, and the art we conceive necessary for producing it, concur to make up our gratification.

EXACTNESS of resemblance is scarce farther approved, than as it evidences skill and enables us to discover the original. *Caravaggio* is censurable for too closely following the life, as well as *Gioseppino* for wantonly deviating from it into fantastical extravagances. Among the antient statuaries likewise, *Demetrius* is censured for being too studious of likeness, and sacrificing beauty to it; and is on this account reckoned inferior to *Lyfippus* and *Praxiteles*, who, at the same time that they excelled in producing likeness, carried it no farther than was consistent with beauty (i). Exactness of resemblance may

(i) Ad veritatem *Lyfippum* et *Praxitelem* accessisse optime affirmant. Nam *Demetrius* tanquam nimius in ea reprehenditur.